Judicialization and Politicization

Week 8

Dr Michal Ovádek

Judicialization and politicization

  • is politics more judicialized than in the past?

  • are courts becoming more politicized?

  • what are the political implications of judicial empowerment?

The rise of constitutionalism

  • the restraining of government through law

  • modern origin in French & American revolution

  • acceleration in response to World War II

  • expansion of constitutional rights and judicial authority

Judicialization of politics

  • the process of power shifting towards courts (and legal institutions) from other branches of government, especially the legislature

  • courts become an important site for settling issues of public policy

  • political actors and action become constrained by court rulings

  • who should ultimately decide matters of public policy?

Judicialization

  • three ways courts have become empowered vis-a-vis the legislatures (Ferejohn 2002):

    1. creation of substantive limits on legislative power
    2. policy-making through litigation and judicial precedent
    3. the regulation of political activity and enforcement of standards

Judicialization

  • two types of effects of courts in judicialized political systems:

    • direct: effects caused by litigation and court rulings

    • indirect: effects produced by the anticipation and threat of litigation

Ex ante v ex post review

  • one type of indirect effect of judicialization is legislator moral hazard (Fox and Stephenson 2011; Ward and Gabel 2019)

    • knowledge that courts will correct ill-advised policies makes legislators behave more recklessly
  • this type of moral hazard is more common with ex ante judicial review (Gabel et al. 2024)

Judicialization

There is hardly any political question in the United States that sooner or later does not turn into a judicial question. From that, the obligation that the parties find in their daily polemics to borrow ideas and language from the judicial system. Since most public men are or have formerly been jurists, they make the habits and the turn of ideas that belong to jurists pass into the handling of public affairs. The jury ends up by familiarizing all classes with them. Thus, judicial language becomes, in a way, the common language; so the spirit of the jurist, born inside the schools and courtrooms, spreads little by little beyond their confines; it infiltrates all of society, so to speak; it descends to the lowest ranks, and the entire people finishes by acquiring a part of the habits and tastes of the magistrate.

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835)

Judicialization

  • intertwined with the “juridification” of modern social life

  • the language of law, rights and adjudication seeps outside the courtroom

  • informal conflict resolution is replaced by judicial or quasi-judicial processes

Judicialization and proceduralism

  • rights and courts contribute to emphasis on formalism and procedural justice

    • widely accepted but narrow conception of justice (Pound 1910)

    • modern courts are less concerned with substantive justice (“the right thing”)

  • the idea is that proceduralism should lead to just outcomes

Judicialization of “mega-politics”

  • Ran Hirschl’s main normative objection to courts is the judicialization of “mega-politics” (Hirschl 2010, 2004)

  • reviewing whether the procedure was observed in public tenders is much less problematic from ruling that a new economic policy is unconstitutional

  • which issues are too “political” for courts?

    • drawing the boundary is a normative judgment

Types of mega-politics cases

  1. Policy: e.g. rulings on the pessification of the Argentinian economy (2003-4)
  2. Electoral: e.g. excluding a candidate or declaring an election void (Romania 2024)
  3. Constitutional: e.g. SA CC demanding amendments to constitution (1996)
  4. Identity: e.g. Turkish Constitutional Court crackdown on religion (1998-2003)

Origins of judicialization

  • functionalist: complexity of modern governance requires more adjudication

  • institutionalist: court design sets off the process of self-empowerment

  • court-centred: judges are power-hungry and drive the process

  • rights-centred: rights and litigants explain expansion of judicial power

International judicialization

  • why would governments establish international judicial regimes that constrain them?

  • Moravcsik (2000) explains it as a form of “republican liberalism”

    • governments lock in their preferences against future political alternatives

    • newly established democracies are driving the process

Judicialization and politicization

  • courts expand their power through decisions on public policy and state institutions

    • such matters naturally invite politicization which can lead to decline of trust in the long-run
  • as courts grow in importance, they also become more attractive to politicians

    • judicialization –> politicization
  • politicians do not act merely within the rules but also with respect to the rules (existing institutions)

    • if e.g. packing a court with loyalists helps to win power or realize political preferences, they will often do it

Politicization

  • beyond court curbing measures enacted by politicians, law and courts can become politicized also by

    • judicial elections

    • high-profile decisions

    • political polarization

    • autocratization

Dejudicialization

  • is the era of increasing judicialization over? (Abebe and Ginsburg 2019)

    • most obvious in the backlash against international courts, e.g. dejudicialization of the WTO
  • but there are also signs in domestic politics

    • e.g. the near total de-legitimization of the Polish Constitutional Court in recent years

References

Abebe, Daniel, and Tom Ginsburg. 2019. “The Dejudicialization of International Politics?” International Studies Quarterly 63 (3): 521–30. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz032.
Ferejohn, John. 2002. “Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law The Law of Politics.” Law and Contemporary Problems 65 (3): 41–68. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/lcp65&i=627.
Fox, Justin, and Matthew C. Stephenson. 2011. “Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing.” American Political Science Review 105 (02): 397414. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000116.
Gabel, Matthew, Clifford J. Carrubba, Gretchen Helmke, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey K. Staton, Dalston Ward, and Jeffrey Ziegler. 2024. “CompLaw: A Coding Protocol and Database for the Comparative Study of Judicial Review.” Journal of Law and Courts 12 (2): 466–92. https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2024.4.
Hirschl, Ran. 2004. “Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, The.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 11: 71. http://0-heinonline.org.biblio.eui.eu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ijgls11&div=8&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=8&men_tab=srchresults.
———. 2010. Constitutional Theocracy. Harvard University Press.
Moravcsik, Andrew. 2000. “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe.” International Organization 54 (2): 217–52. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551163.
Pound, Roscoe. 1910. “Law in Books and Law in Action.” American Law Review 44: 12. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/amlr44&id=16&div=&collection=.
Ward, Dalston G., and Matthew Gabel. 2019. “Judicial Review Timing and Legislative Posturing: Reconsidering the Moral Hazard Problem.” The Journal of Politics 81 (2): 681–85. https://doi.org/10.1086/701763.