7: Court Curbing, Backlash and Capture

What is the relationship between courts, legislatures and executives, and what happens when politicians decide to push back against courts? This week we look at the politics of court curbing, backlash and capture, including how courts anticipate and adapt to threats such as legislative override, court-packing and jurisdiction-stripping.

Mandatory readings

Stiansen, Øyvind, and Erik Voeten. “Backlash and Judicial Restraint: Evidence From the European Court of Human Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 4 (2020): 770-784. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa047

Lambais, Guilherme, and Henrik Sigstad. “Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes.” Journal of Public Economics 217 (2023): 104788. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104788

Mehmood, Sultan, and Bakhtawar Ali. “Judicial capture.” The Economic Journal 134, no. 659 (2024): 1287-1301. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead106

Optional readings

Bartels, Brandon L., and Christopher D. Johnston. Curbing the Court: Why the Public Constrains Judicial Independence. Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316979754

Ginsburg, Tom, and Aziz Z. Huq. How to Save a Constitutional Democracy. University of Chicago Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.001.0001

Aydin-Cakir, Aylin, and Amanda Driscoll. “On motives and means: how approach and justification for court-curbing impact public trust.” Democratization 32, no. 4 (2025): 938-962. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2024.2428271

Schwartz, Alex. “Court Curbing in the United Kingdom.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 73, no. 4 (2025): 830-871. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avaf033

Helmke, Gretchen. “The logic of strategic defection: Court-executive relations in Argentina under dictatorship and democracy.” American Political Science Review 96, no. 2 (2002): 291-303. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402000175

Larsson, Olof, and Daniel Naurin. “Judicial independence and political uncertainty: how the risk of override affects the Court of Justice of the EU.” International Organization 70, no. 2 (2016): 377-408. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000047

Whittington, Keith E. ““Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (2005): 583-596. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051890

Clark, Tom S. “The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy.” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 4 (2009): 971-989. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00411.x

Peffley, Mark, and Robert Rohrschneider. “Populism and Support for Limiting the Power of Constitutional Courts: The Case of Germany.” Political Behavior 46, no. 4 (2024): 2497-2518. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09928-8

Voeten, Erik. “Populism and Backlashes against International Courts.” Perspectives on Politics 18, no. 2 (2020): 407-422. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719000975

Abebe, Daniel, and Tom Ginsburg. “The Dejudicialization of International Politics?” International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 3 (2019): 521-530. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz032

Botero, Sandra, Daniel Brinks, and Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos. The Limits of Judicialization: From Progress to Backlash in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009093859

Driscoll, Amanda, and Michael J. Nelson. “The Costs of Court Curbing: Evidence from the United States.” The Journal of Politics 85, no. 2 (2023): 609-624. https://doi.org/10.1086/723021

Pavone, Tommaso, and Øyvind Stiansen. “The Shadow Effect of Courts: Judicial Review and the Politics of Preemptive Reform.” American Political Science Review 116, no. 1 (2022): 322-336. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000873